Sources,
not slogans.

The map uses the September 9, 2026 OpenStreetMap/DeFlock snapshot. It contains 155 points, with no duplicate source IDs or identical coordinates. Nearby points may be separate cameras; they are not automatically merged.

This is not an official operational inventory or an ownership map. Points may be outdated or inaccurate. All 155 existing entries were checked against the live OpenStreetMap API on September 15: coordinates and ALPR tags were unchanged. A separate proximity review found nine pairs within ten meters. Several have different reported directions; matching-direction pairs remain unresolved and are retained as separate source entries. This check does not discover every new installation or confirm physical operation; the source snapshot remains September 9.

Download the map data · OpenStreetMap contributors, ODbL

Every agency production is preserved in the project archive. Public downloads are temporarily withheld while publication copies are checked for unnecessary personal information, hidden metadata and active document content. The evidence notes below identify the records used for each finding.

The retention setting and change history document 1,825 days. Compare the user roster with detection-search timestamps for the training discrepancy. The September 4 response describes the first formal audit log and claims earlier reviews; a formal summary entry does not establish the scope or quality of those reviews. The purchase order and invoice describe the same purchase, not two separate expenses. Sharing permissions do not establish actual searches.

• Retention periods.png
• 5. Changes to retention settings.pdf
• 2026 ALPR User Acces & Audit Log.xlsx
• 1. Access, Search, Query, Audit log June 2023 to Present Redacted.xlsx
• September 4, 2026 response — audit procedures and formal audit log
• Purchase Order.pdf
• Invoice.pdf
• 5. Data Sharing Report 04-21-2026.pdf

Official SLOPD Policy 503

The network-event export covers July 8–August 7, 2026: 564,444 events involving 310 organizations. This is distinct from the 313 organizations in the sharing-permissions export. Search scope is not a returned plate match. Exhibit A on PDF page 7 of the five-year contract identifies four cameras, $10,000 annually, $50,000 total and 30-day cloud retention. Downloaded copies have separate policy requirements.

• REDACTED - Item #6 7_8_2026-8_7_2026-San Luis Obispo CA PD-Network-Audit.xlsx
• PRODUCE AS IS - Item #5 SharedNetworks_2026_August_7.csv
• REDACTED - Item #6 7_8_2026-8_7_2026-San Luis Obispo CA PD-Audit.csv.xlsx
• FLOCK- 5 year.pdf
• Records Retention Policy and Schedule.pdf

Annualized subscription charges use nine readers at $27,000, five at $15,000 and three at $9,000. Successive annual invoices and cumulative grant reports must not be added as separate annual costs. Policy 428 describes oversight requirements; the policy itself is not an audit. The September 10 correspondence says no audit documentation exists while claiming periodic reviews. That correspondence is not yet downloadable in this library.

• ALPR Policy Section 428.pdf
• Flock Safety $9,000.00 Feb 2025_Redacted.pdf
• Flock Safety $15,000.00 Oct 2025_Redacted.pdf
• Flock Safety $27,000.00 Apr 2025_Redacted.pdf
• Flock Safety $27,000.00 Apr 2026_Redacted.pdf
• _Award_Details_FAW-182329.pdf

These are the four produced documents. The two payment packets contain $11,250.30 in distinct charges across multiple periods; the included check supports $7,200.38 paid. Repeated invoice and payment-request copies are not additional charges. Produced Policy 461 includes regular audits in section 461.5(c). The online manual uses a different version and numbering; neither establishes actual compliance. On September 15, the City stated that the proposed two-to-ten-camera expansion was not pursued. It described a Tyler, Police SharePoint and citywide Laserfiche search covering January 2022–July 2026 and said no records were knowingly withheld. That is an agency statement, not independent proof that no electronic operational records exist. No completed audit evidence was supplied. The reply does not separately state that no audit was ever performed. The City also says it cannot produce the referenced VS ESA agreement and that the Police Department did not know of it until this request—a documented contract-record gap, not a concession that the agreement never existed.

• DOJ License Plate Download Usage Agreement.pdf
• Invoice (1).pdf
• Policy 461.pdf
• VIGILANT SOLUTIONS LLC.pdf

January 2026 official manual — Policy 434, PDF pages 425–427

The library contains the signed Vigilant acknowledgment and 24 historical policy excerpts. The acknowledgment incorporates other contract documents that were not supplied. The historical excerpts use Policy 435; the separately reviewed January 2026 manual uses Policy 434. No operational log or completed audit report appears in this production. The September 14 release notice repeated the same filenames; content revisions have not been established.

• LPR - Up to 50 sworn.pdf
• RELEASE_20250307_T182908_Paso Robles PD Policy Manual (2).pdf

The request remains pending in the reviewed correspondence. No production is currently catalogued here. The reviewed Policy 462 describes oversight requirements, not demonstrated compliance; its currentness has not been confirmed. An unanswered request is not evidence that the City conducted no audits.

No substantive production is currently catalogued here. Policy 470 in the posted manual describes training before access, access records and regular audits (PDF pages 473–474). Those requirements do not establish deployment or compliance. Request receipt remains unconfirmed in the reviewed correspondence.

• Posted police manual — Policy 470

PRA 26-348 expressly withholds operational and administrative logs. Policy 466.5(e) requires annual audits, but the response does not resolve whether completed reports exist. The June 2025 order identifies 19 LPR and four PTZ units and $154,850 over the initial two-year term; ordered quantities are not a current inventory. Sharing lists describe configuration and must not be presented as proof of actual federal access. Templeton location alone does not identify the camera operator.

• PRA 26-348 Response.pdf
• LPR Policy RELEASE_20260112_T144547_San-Luis-Obispo-County-SO-Policy-Manual.pdf
• flock-agreement.pdf
• flock-contract.pdf
• Flock Sharing.pdf
• Motorola share list 11-7-22 D_S_R_2022110712315866.pdf

The 27+ error-incident ledger and the reported personal-tracking cases are compiled from court records, government reviews, official settlement records, and source-linked reporting. The 16+ gunpoint figure is a conservative manual count of incidents in which the available account specifically describes officers drawing or pointing firearms.

• Institute for Justice: documented ALPR error incidents
• Institute for Justice: reported personal-tracking cases
• San Francisco audit: 299 improper searches
• Virginia State Crime Commission national ALPR review

No government maintains a complete national record of ALPR errors or misuse. These are documented minimums, not a national error rate.

The direct total of $2,539,500 includes five resolved matters in which an ALPR alert, stale hotlist, or ALPR-supported identification materially contributed to the alleged stop, detention, arrest, or force. The broader $2,693,500 figure adds $154,000 in documented privacy and statutory-compliance fee awards.

Only $35,000 in the present settlement ledger is conclusively tied to a Flock-triggered physical encounter. The totals exclude pending claims, demands, confidential resolutions, most defense costs, and settlements we could not reliably verify.